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BOOK REVIEWS
Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. Cornell Uni­
versity Press, 2005, 226 pages. $45 (hardback).
MARK D. LINVILLE, Atlanta Christian College
This work serves both as a foundation for J. L. Schellenberg's own project­
ed work and as a proposal for the general field of philosophy of religion. 
As he sees it, work in the area needs to be placed upon a better footing, 
and this is largely because of inattention to prolegomena. These include 
careful analysis of several concepts—religion, belief, disbelief, skepticism, 
faith—that are widely discussed but do not enjoy wide agreement, as well 
as careful reflection on the proper aims of the discipline.
Philosophers of religion tend to share a basic set of assumptions—"the 
received view"—regarding those aims, which are typically thought prin­
cipally to involve inquiries into the meaning (e.g., coherence) and justi­
fication of religious truth claims or propositions (p. 184). According to 
Schellenberg, the received view is incomplete if not incorrect. He argues 
that the various responses to religious truth claims (belief, disbelief, faith, 
skepticism), as well as the persons who respond in one or another of those 
ways, are proper objects of assessment. And there are legitimate and high­
er-level aims that go beyond such assessment. For example, philosophers 
of religion commonly suppose that the results of work in metaphysics, 
epistemology and ethics may be brought to bear in the assessment of reli­
gious conceptual systems. But what implications might religion have for 
those disciplines (p. 187)? And perhaps philosophers of religion who are 
concerned to evaluate religious practices and persons in addition to propo­
sitions should give "careful consideration" to "the ideas of experiential 
and non-truth-oriented support for religious belief" and faith (p. 188), as 
perhaps either of these positive responses to religious claims may be justi­
fied even in the absence of any truth-oriented support.
Further, there is a rather myopic concern only with those religious 
conceptual systems that have been articulated in the past. Should not 
philosophers of religion be more open to religious beliefs "that have not 
yet been articulated by anyone, or made the basis of a form of religious 
life in the actual world, but await our discovery" (p. 190)? (This sugges­
tion may strike some as rather odd. Perhaps the time is ripe for a schol­
arly tome exploring a collection of possible but non-actual religions —
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things that people might have believed but never did. One's imagination 
runs wild!)
With this challenge to the received view, Schellenberg hopes to stimu­
late further discussion regarding those aims and, perhaps, to rouse some of 
us from our dogmatic slumbers (p. xi). His interesting and original (some­
times novel) ideas and supporting arguments are likely to do just that.
Chapter one is given to an analysis of the concept of "religion." Hav­
ing surveyed the literature, Schellenberg finds little agreement. Follow­
ing William James and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, he notes that the term 
"religion" is ambiguous between the "personal" and "institutional" sens­
es, where the former refers to individual "spirituality" and the latter to 
publicly identifiable traditions. He also follows James and Smith in their 
contention that the personal expression is the more basic of the two. And 
so, the chapter aims primarily at an analysis of "Person S is religious." 
(His motive for this emphasis becomes clear later when he argues that 
philosophy of religion should be concerned with responses to religious 
truth claims, as well as to the religious responders, over and above the truth 
claims themselves).
One potential obstacle here is the "family resemblance approach," 
which has it that, though there are typical shared characteristics among 
major religions, no one combination is necessary and sufficient for inclu­
sion. Schellenberg argues that even proponents of this theory may be seen, 
despite themselves, to be operating with just such a criterion as that sought 
in his own analysis. If it is possible to disqualify an activity (croquet?) or 
an attitude (my penchant for India Pale Ales?) from being characterized as 
religious, then, on the flip side, we have the means for determining what 
qualifies something as a religion (pp. 10- 11).
Without claiming to have established a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for defining "religiosity," Schellenberg urges the following 
common features: "(1) Frequent thoughts of a transmundane reality; (2) 
an emphasis on a significant good, for oneself and others, that may be re­
alized through a proper relation to this reality; (3) the cultivation of such 
a relation; and (4) a disposition or tendency, when attending to matters in 
which they are implicated, to . . . totalize or ultimize in some way the central 
elements of features (1) to (3)" (p. 12).
For the purposes of doing philosophy of religion, Schellenberg urges 
that the notion of ultimization in (4) be made central. Thus, he suggests 
that a person S is religious just in case (1) S takes there to be a reality that 
is ultimate, in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained, and (2) 
S's ultimate commitment is to the cultivation of dispositions appropriate 
to this state of affairs. He argues that all religions—including essentially 
atheistic ones like Buddhism—identify some transcendent reality as both 
axiologically and metaphysically ultimate, and a religious person is one 
who displays a positive and committed response to such a claim. Thus, 
"ultimism" is his term of choice for capturing the essence of religion.
While I think that his "technical definition" is promising, one may won­
der whether the philosopher of religion (as opposed to someone in Religious 
Studies) should be especially concerned with such definitional matters. 
First, it is not clear to me that this bit of prolegomena has been neglected. 
Three standard texts are handy to me: Peterson, et al., Taliaferro, Yandell.
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Each devotes a section to the definition of "religion." I suspect that these 
are typical. Schellenberg is correct in observing that there is nothing like a 
consensus here (though the differences are not exactly as the East is to the 
West). Does the addition of his own definition alter that fact? Further, I am 
inclined to think that whether a conceptual system qualifies as religious 
under some plausible criterion is secondary to the question of whether 
its essential truth claims are likely true. If the system is reasonably influ­
ential, has some degree of plausibility (thus precluding, say, Scientology 
and the Raelian "faith"), and is deemed religious, then this may well be suf­
ficient for its truth claims being taken up for assessment. As Keith Yandell 
has urged, philosophers are in the business of constructing and assessing 
"categorial systems." The move to religious categorial systems is, seamless. 
I suppose that here I reveal my own dogmatic slumber, and do so despite 
Schellenberg's attempt to wake me.
Chapters two through six are concerned with analyses of b elief-reli­
gious and otherw ise-as well as religious disbelief, religious skepticism - 
including both passive and deliberate suspension of judgment, and reli­
gious faith. We learn (later) that (propositional) belief, disbelief, faith and 
doubt (as a suspension of judgment) are mutually incompatible. I f  they 
together exhaust the possible responses to religious propositions (Schel- 
lenberg entertains other possibilities in a footnote), then it follows that 
one, and only one, of these responses to a given religious claim will be 
justified for a given person.
As with his discussion of religion, Schellenberg observes that "belief" 
has both internal and external senses: the believing states of individuals 
and the propositions believed. Unlike many writers in the field-philoso­
phers, anyw ay-his focus is on belief as a psychological state-"how it 
feels from the inside to be a believer"-because  "such a phenomenological ap­
proach can yield some important insights about belief and also about the 
justification of religious and irreligious belief" (p. 41). He argues that be­
lieving states have states o f a ffa irs-n ot  propositions-as their object. More 
to the point, to believe is to apprehend some state of affairs under the 
concept "reality." Strictly speaking, our propositional beliefs are directed 
at the world itse lf-n o t propositions that purport to describe it -a n d  so 
beliefs are "world-thoughts" (p. 50). "I am not...thinking of a proposition 
and under the impression it is true; rather, I am thinking of a state of af­
fairs and under the impression that it obtains" (p. 44). He adds, "conscious 
believing is not self-conscious" (p. 44).
This strikes me as a plausible account of the phenomenology of belief 
when considering everyday waking experiences and the often unconscious 
beliefs that attend them (e.g., my interaction with students presupposes 
my belief that they are present, but only rarely do I attend to the proposi­
tion, "There are people present.") The plausibility stands, I think, despite 
the fact that having the belief would seem to entail the conscious affirma­
tion of the proposition once attended to. One is reminded of Chesterton's 
observation in Orthodoxy (chap. 6) that it is easier to defend those beliefs 
of which we are only partly convinced than those of which we are entirely 
convinced. "Thus, if one asked an ordinary intelligent man, on the spur 
of the moment, 'Why do you prefer civilization to savagery?' he would 
look wildly round at object after object, and would only be able to answer
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vaguely, 'Why, there is that bookcase . . . and the coals in the coal-scuttle 
. . . and pianos . . . and policemen.'"
Further, Schellenberg argues that such beliefs are had involuntarily. 
There are no immediate steps that I may take to bring it about either that 
I do or do not believe that my students share the classroom with me. The 
belief is engendered by the experience.
Religious belief, then, is a matter of taking there to be some metaphysi­
cally and axiologically ultimate reality, or, to have a world-thought of such 
a reality. And religious disbelief is thus a matter of taking some state of 
affairs S to obtain, where the corresponding proposition entails the nonex­
istence of any such reality. Schellenberg explains that religious disbelief is 
"about as opposed, intellectually, to religious belief as anything could be" 
(p. 39). But belief and disbelief do not exhaust the possible responses to 
daims regarding the Ultimate. The religious skeptic doubts or suspends 
judgment regarding such claims. Interestingly, Schellenberg holds that re­
ligious propositional faith  is a variety of such skepticism. With pure reli­
gious skepticism, it shares this suspense of judgment with respect to belief 
and disbelief, but unlike its skeptical cousin, doubt, it involves a positive 
response to the claim. Despite a lack of supporting evidence, the faithful 
voluntarily represent the world to themselves as including that reality.
As mentioned above, Schellenberg takes the various responses to re­
ligious claims to be mutually incompatible, and this, of course, includes 
religious propositional faith and religious propositional belief. Thus, one 
of the more striking proposals of this book is the claim that propositional 
religious faith not only does not require religious belief, but that the two 
are incompatible (p. 132). Schellenberg thinks that belief is compatible 
with what he terms operational faith, which refers to a lifestyle of commit­
ment, loyalty and trust. But those who manifest propositional faith "will 
respond in the negative to the question, 'Do you believe that p?' and also 
to the question 'Do you think it is true that p?'" (p. 137).
One important argument for this rather novel position is that, whereas 
faith is widely thought to be voluntary assent and under one's direct con­
trol, belief is not. Faith is a matter of intentionally representing the world 
to oneself in a certain way (p. 134). Faith requires a paucity of evidence, 
is viewed as meritorious, is intentionally sustained (and is vulnerable if 
not) and may be abandoned at will. Belief, says Schellenberg, has none of 
these characteristics. He draws support for his account of faith as volun­
tary and beliefless from ordinary language and practice. People speak of 
"stepping out on faith," of "walking by faith," and "taking it on faith" that 
some claim is true. Such language, he suggests, is "best interpreted on the 
assumption that faith is voluntary in our sense [and] provides substantial 
support for that view" (p. 150).
It is not clear to me that Schellenberg establishes his case for belief­
less faith. First, one may wonder whether his notion of faith as a state of 
mind that may be taken up or terminated at will is either paradigmatic or 
meritorious. Perhaps we move in different circles, but I cannot say that 
I've encountered any mature practitioners who seemed to regard faith in 
this way. Many may be found who would affirm that they believe, say, the 
"great things of the gospel," but do not know of their truth with certainty. 
Many more may be found whose faith is without evidential support. But
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is it common to find someone professing propositional faith in such things 
while denying that they "take them to be true"? More typical, I think, is the 
person who "takes it on faith that it is true," which may just be to believe 
it in the absence of sufficient evidence. Even the small child, whose faith 
is, not surprisingly, childlike, when asked, "Do you believe what Mommy 
says is true?." will most likely respond in the affirmative. One would be 
stunned to hear, "No, but I am voluntarily representing it to myself as 
though it is."
And we may ask whether the apparent involuntariness of belief does 
indeed put it at odds with faith as typically manifested. I do not see that it 
does. There are (many) other accounts of faith and belief that accord with 
the more traditional notion of faith as involving propositional belief. One's 
propositional faith regarding a claim might be indirect, having as its direct 
object the integrity and sensibility of someone who earnestly believes. We 
can imagine active and expectant participation in a seance, say, solely on 
the grounds that (a) the sought phenomenon is not thought to be impos­
sible, and (b) one's believing host is highly regarded and deemed reliable. 
Here, one's involuntary "world-thought" that one's host is credible would 
seem to be at the core of whatever "faith" is manifested. Thus, "I believe 
that whatever he believes is true." Similarly, I might come to faith on the 
grounds that the faithful around me demonstrate lives of integrity and 
attribute this to their religious belief. Though I do not see whatever evi­
dence they seem to see, I believe on the basis of their testimony and then, 
perhaps, grow into a mature faith or belief of my own. (My current belief 
in the recent discoveries of molecular biologists may be analogous here.)
Or the basic outlines of some claim may just "ring true" to me in such 
a way that the possibility of its being true seems worthy of pursuit. My 
first inklings based upon the "starry heavens above m e"—or, perhaps, the 
moral corruption that I perceive within me—are not thus groundless even 
though I may be incapable of stating a compelling case for my developing 
faith. Many believers whom I have known have been in just this position.
And perhaps such believers are in this position for good reason. Alvin 
Plantinga has reminded us of Calvin's account of a sensus divinitatus which, 
though marred by sin, may be engaged upon an encounter with "what has 
been made." Perhaps the voluntariness, accessibility, vulnerability, termi- 
nability and merit of belief are explained on a model quite unlike that ap­
parently presupposed by Schellenberg. Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin Model 
of warranted Christian belief consciously rejects the seemingly deontolog­
ical assumptions that animate Schellenberg's discussion of propositional 
religious belief and its justification. Perhaps the faithful believe in the ab­
sence of public evidence precisely because their belief is basic, and prop­
erly so. If Plantinga is correct, then it is possible that such beliefs are well 
grounded though non-inferential. Such belief may well be involuntary in 
that it follows ineluctably in the wake of what seems true to such believ­
ers, but the Christian tradition seems to suggest that belief and unbelief 
are a function of one's underlying moral and spiritual disposition. They 
are thus voluntary insofar as we are responsible for such dispositions. Ac­
cording to that particular tradition, unbelief is the result of "suppressing" 
the truth (and I take it that this need not always be conscious or episodic). 
Those who are genuine in their search will find what they seek, and this
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is precisely because He is not far from each of us. Schellenberg claims that 
faith might be had as a result of some deliberate action that one may take. 
Perhaps the action is the equivalent of opening one's eyes.
Schellenberg also appeals to a number of secular examples of what he 
sees as faith without belief. A runner doubtful that he will win the race 
understands that the doubt itself can lead to defeat. Never quite abandon­
ing the doubt, he focuses on the proposition that he will do well. A woman 
learns that there is a strong possibility that her friend was in one of the 
Twin Towers on 911, but it is not certain either way. Unable to learn her 
friend's actual fate, she focuses on the idea of her friend's having escaped 
harm, and spends that September day affirming "So be it, so be it"(pp. 
130-131). I find such examples utterly unconvincing. "Visualizing" a de­
sired outcome as a device for success or serenity does not seem to me to 
correspond to what is typically found in religious faith, even if, for want 
of a better word, we may describe the runner and the concerned friend as 
manifesting "faith."
There is certainly much room for discussion of Schellenberg's account 
of beliefless faith, but, among those who see any relevance in such a dis­
cussion, it is likely to meet a great deal of resistance.
More generally, one might challenge the wisdom of Schellenberg's shift 
of emphasis away from the assessment of religious truth claims to that of 
responses to those claims. To be sure, he suggests, "considering the chal­
lenge that nonreligious responses to religious claims are rationally preferable to 
religious ones should be deemed paramount" (p. 193). Those "nonreligious 
responses" include either disbelief or doubt, as mentioned earlier. But un­
less one is already sold on his account of beliefless faith, which introduces 
a fourth possible response to the recognized set of belief, disbelief, and 
agnosticism, then one might suppose that the ongoing task of assessing 
religious propositions is adequate for this goal. (With the introduction of 
Schellenberg's skeptical version of faith, we might look to further-per- 
haps non-epistemic-grounds that would justify faith over doubt in the 
case of an epistemic tie.)
Further, Schellenberg asks, "Why focus on just propositional belief or 
propositional faith when your main interest is in the way of life it may 
inform?" (p. 189). But one wonders whether it is, in fact, true that the "way 
of life" is the concern, much less the "main interest," of the philosopher 
of religion qua philosopher of religion. The person who happens to be a 
metaphysician may be keenly interested in the practical implications that 
his conclusions regarding free will have for, say, moral responsibility, child 
rearing or the penal system. And the question of whether his disagreeing 
colleague is fulfilling his epistemic duties may be a consideration should 
that colleague apply to become a fellow member of the Drones Club. But as 
a metaphysician, he is concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with the ques­
tion, "Which view gets this stuff right?" To imagine the metaphysician or 
the epistemologist or the philosopher of science to perceive her task as that 
of evaluating responses (belief, disbelief, faith, doubt) to functionalism, relia- 
bilism or sociobiology is to set oneself up for parody. The concern in these 
cases is and ought to be with the views themselves, and the objects of assess­
ment are the ideas and their supporting arguments. Why should anyone 
think that the task should be any different for the philosopher of religion?
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Schellenberg observes that there is, in fact, a body of literature focusing 
on the rationality or irrationality of persons in holding religious beliefs, 
and he footnotes Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief as an example (p. 
178). But even the question of whether the individual believer is warrant­
ed in his belief is not considered for its own sake. It is set within a more 
general context: are there any good de jure objections to Christian belief? 
Have we reason to suppose that Christian belief is merely the product of 
some belief-producing mechanism that is not truth-aimed? In all of this, I 
suggest, the real item of interest is the epistemic status of the truth claim 
itself. This no more indicates a concern for the justification of responses or 
respondents than does Reid's reply to Hume regarding beliefs about one's 
own cranial composition. (Indeed, Plantinga argues that nearly any token 
belief may be justified—and  the individual justified and/or internally ra­
tional-depending upon what seems true to the individual who has been 
epistemically dutiful. If this is correct, then a concern for the justification 
of responders and responses would seem even less grave.)
I am inclined to think that the "received tradition," which itself includes 
wide disagreement, has been conducting business roughly as it ought.
In Search of the Soul, ed. Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer. InterVarsity 
Press, 2005. 215 pages. $20.00 (paper).
KELLY JAMES CLARK, Calvin College
When I was a student I met a man who was a sweet, gentle, Pentecostal 
Christian. He later sustained a closed head injury in a snowmobile ac­
cident through no fault of his own. When he emerged from his coma, his 
personality was thoroughly changed: no longer sweet and gentle, no lon­
ger a Christian. He had become, through a bump on the head, a bitter, an­
gry atheist. For this firmly committed mind-body dualist of the most crass 
Cartesian variety (here I mean the caricature of Cartesian dualism that 
bears little resemblance to the dualism of Descartes), a bump on the head 
should not affect beliefs, emotions and attitudes. The mind, after all, exists 
in the non-physical world and is only connected to the body temporarily 
and uni-directionally—the mind rules the body but is unaffected by the 
physical stuff of the brain. And I began to wonder, could this man's eternal 
salvation hang upon a bump on the head (or any other physical processes 
over which he has no control)?
At that time, and for a long time thereafter, I thought that THE Chris­
tian view of the person, on which hung all of the Law and the Prophets, 
was mind-body dualism. And to reject mind-body dualism was at best 
heresy and at worse a repudiation of the Christian faith. I have since come 
to believe that nothing of importance, other than understanding our na­
ture as persons, hangs on mind-body dualism: not orthodoxy, not salva­
tion, not moral responsibility, not human dignity, not free will, and not 
post-mortem existence (after all, we confess to the resurrection of the body 
not the immortality of the soul); and not, for crying out loud, forgiveness 
and hospitality (this will become apparent later).
